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NOTE
THE PRESENCE OF STATE ACTION IN UNITED
STEEL WORKERS V. WEBER
In United Steelworkers v. Weber' the Supreme Court decided that
an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial dis-
crimination did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
Weber, who had been denied admission to his plant's training program
even though less senior black employees had been accepted, asserted
that he had been discriminated against because he was white. Weber
did not seriously pursue a cause of action under the fifth amendment of
the Constitution;3 as a result, the Court did not consider whether the
1. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the
Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment's due process clause includes a requirement of
equal protection and places the same constitutional limitations on federal action as the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause places on state action. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 721 (1963). See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
Unlike the plaintiffs in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), who asserted that they were entitled to constitutional protec-
tion, Weber relegated this argument to a footnote. Weber asserted:
A theoretical constitutional issue could arise if the Court determined that Congress in
Title VII, or by its subsequent failure to enact amendments to Title VII, authorized the
executive branch to require the imposition of racial preferences. However, this case does
not involve a government-imposed quota, even though the regulations and requirements
of the OFCC were a motivating force in the decision of Kaiser and USWA to institute
the 50 per cent quota.
Brief for Respondents at 46 n.186, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
In Davis a United States Congressman fired a female assistant because he decided "that it
was essential that [the assistant] be a man." 442 U.S. at 230. In a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court held that the assistant could bring an action for damages directly under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Id at 24849.
In Bakke the Medical School of the University of California at Davis rejected a white appli-
cant. The applicant contended that the admission committee's affirmative action policies uncon-'
stitutionally discriminated against him solely because of his race. The Supreme Court held that
the admission policy was unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Justices Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens declined to reach the
constitutional question, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) prohibited the plan. Justices Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun found the plan compatible with the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Powell concluded that the particular plan violated the fouteenth amendment. For an anal-
ysis of the decision's implications, see Symposium: Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 67 CALIF. L. REv. I (1979). See also Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Pro-
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state action in the case was sufficient to trigger the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment's due process clause.
Fullilove v. Klutznick,4 decided last term, presented the Supreme
Court with a "reverse discrimination" claim brought under the fifth
amendment. The minority business provision of the Public Works Em-
ployment Act of 19775 requires that, absent an administrative waiver,
at least ten percent of the federal funds granted for public works
projects be used to procure services or supplies from businesses of
which fifty percent or more is owned by members of minority groups.
The Court held that the set-aside provision is constitutional.
Because of important distinctions between the Fullilove set-aside
program and the Weber affirmative action plan, the question whether a
Weber plan would survive a fifth amendment challenge remains open.
6
The most important difference is that the Fullilove program was en-
acted by Congress. The Court defers to Congress in this area because
the Constitution charges the legislative branch with providing for the
general welfare of the United States and with enforcing the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 The Court has held that
Congress has the power to define violations of the equal protection
clause and to remedy such violations.8 Although the use of racial and
ethnic criteria led the Fullilove Court to scrutinize the set-aside provi-
cedural Fairnes, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979); Van Alstyne, A Preliminary
Report on the Bakke Case, 64 A.A.U.P. BULL. 286 (1978); Van Alstyne, Controversy: More on the
Bakke Decision, 65 ACADEME 49 (1979).
4. 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f(2) (Supp. I 1978).
6. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in two cases involving constitutional
attacks on affirmative action plans. See Johnson v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 604 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) (No. 79-1356); Minnick v. California Dep't of Correc-
tions, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) (No. 79-
1213).
7. In Fullilove, the Court stated:
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 102
• . . (1973), we accorded "great weight to the decisions of Congress" even though the
legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. The rule is not different when a congressional program raises equal protection
concerns. See, e.g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213 ... (1978);
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 . . . (1976).
100 S. Ct. at 2772.
8. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Katzenbach the Court held that Congress
had the power to remedy past discrimination. In Fullilove, Justice Powell, concurring, stated:
"Implicit in.. . [Katzenbach's] holding was the Court's belief that Congress had the authority to
find, and had found, that members of this minority group had suffered governmental discrimina-
tion." 100 S. Ct. at 2786 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell also recalled that in South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), the Court had noted that Congress has authority to
define and provide remedies for violations of the fifteenth amendment. 100 S. Ct. at 2786.
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sion strictly,9 the Court determined that Congress had acted within its
constitutional authority.'0 In contrast to the Fullilove set-aside pro-
gram, the Weber affirmative action plan was implemented pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement between private parties." Govern-
ment agencies induced and approved the affirmative action plan,12 but
Congress did not specifically authorize it.13 The Court would subject a
plan coerced by government agencies to a more rigorous review than
one enacted by Congress.' 4
This distinction, along with other differences between the Fulllove
and Weber affirmative action plans,' 5 indicates that a constitutional at-
tack on a Weber-type plan might still be successful. If presented with
such a challenge, the Court would need to determine, as a threshold
9. Strict scrutiny is required even if the racial or ethnic classification has a remedial pur-
pose. 100 S. Ct. at 2771. The Court stated:
Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a school board but on a
considered decision of the Congress and the President. However, in no sense does that
render it immune from judicial scrutiny and it "is not to say we 'defer' to the judgment of
the Congress. . . on a Constitutional question," or that we would hesitate to invoke the
constitution should we determine that Congress has overstepped the bounds of its consti-
tutional power. Columbia Broadcasting, .. 412 U.S. [94] at 103 [1973] ....
Congress may employ racial or ethnic classifications in exercising its Spending or other
legislative Powers only if those classifications do not violate the equal protection compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We recognize the need for
careful judicial evaluation to assure that any congressional program that employs racial
or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past
discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.
100 S. Ct. at 2772, 2776. The Court applied a two-step analysis. First, it determined that the
objectives of the minority business enterprise provision were within the power of Congress. Id. at
2772-75. Second, it decided that the "limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context
presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives and
does not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment." Id. at 2772, 2775-80 (emphasis omitted).
10. Id. at 2780. The Court noted, however, that "the program may press the outer limits of
congressional authority .. " Id. at 2781.
11. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
12. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
13. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub
nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
14. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2777 (1980), the Court stated: "It is fundamen-
tal that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive
remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and
authority to enforce equal protection guarantees."
15. There are two other significant distinctions between Fullilove and Weber. First, the Full-
love program included a number of minority groups, yet permitted flexibility of administration.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). The Court stressed these features in Fullilove in up-
holding the set-aside program. 100 S. Ct. at 2779-80. The Weber plan, on the other hand, applied
only to blacks and mandated a strict racial quota. 443 U.S. at 199. Second, Fulilove involved a
facial constitutional challenge to the Act, see 100 S. Ct. at 2775, whereas in Weber there was an
attack on the application of the affirmative action plan, see 443 U.S. at 200. The Court probably
would have examined the Fullilove plan more closely, and perhaps would have reached a different
conclusion, had the plaintiff in that case been directly affected by the plan.
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matter, whether sufficient state action was present to raise fifth amend-
ment questions. This Note argues that the government contacts with
the defendants in Weber were sufficient to constitute state action and
thus to trigger fifth amendment protections. These contacts included
the National Labor Relations Board's involvement with Weber's union,
the United Steelworkers of America;16 the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's pressure upon Weber's employer, Kaiser Alumi-
num and Chemical Corporation, to institute affirmative action plans;' 7
and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs' insistence
that private contractors seeking government contracts implement af-
firmative action plans. 18 Although predicting the result of a constitu-
tional challenge to a Weber-type plan is beyond the scope of this Note,
an analysis of the facts in Weber and of the case law on state action
demonstrates that a court should reach the constitutional issue if it is
presented again in a similar case. 19
I. THE FACTS OF WEBER
The United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation entered into a collective bargaining agreement
covering fifteen Kaiser plants, including the one that employed Weber.
The agreement required Kaiser to train production workers to fill craft
openings by establishing programs in which the trainees would be se-
lected on the basis of seniority. The parties agreed to eliminate racial
imbalance in Kaiser's craft work forces by reserving for blacks half the
openings in a plant's program until the percentage of black craft work-
ers in a plant was equal to the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force. 20 Pursuant to this plan, the Kaiser plant in Gramercy, Louisi-
ana, selected seven black and six white craft trainees from its produc-
tion work force. The most senior blacks selected had less seniority than
several rejected white production workers. Weber, one of the rejected
white workers, instituted a class action to obtain injunctive and mone-
tary relief.2' He claimed that the affirmative action plan denied him
the opportunity to participate in the training program solely because of
16. See text accompanying notes 75-134 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 135-58 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 159-75 infra.
19. Weber's attorney did not vigorously assert Weber's constitutional rights apparently be-
cause he was confident that Weber would prevail on his Title VII claim. Furthermore, the attor-
ney probably believed that if the Court found state action the federal government would be
encouraged to assume a more active role in the implementation of affirmative action plans.
20. 443 U.S. at 199.
21. Id. at 199-200.
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his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22
Neither the district court23 nor the court of appeals,24 which both
found in Weber's favor, discussed any constitutional issues. The
Supreme Court, reversing the lower courts, agreed that the only ques-
tion presented was the interpretation of Title VII: "[Wihether Title VII
forbids private employers and unions.from voluntarily agreeing upon
bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the
manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan."25
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, concluded from the legislative
history that Congress did not intend through Title VII to prohibit all
voluntary race-conscious affrmative action.26
Both the district court and the court of appeals stated that there
had been substantial government involvement in the affirmative action
plan. The -district court found that if the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission had not exerted so much pressure on Kaiser and the Steelwork-
ers Union, they would never have instituted the affirmative action plan:
"satisfying the requirements of OFCC, and avoiding vexatious litiga-
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976).
23. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976), aft'd, 563
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rey'd sub nom.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
25. 443 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added). The Court stated: "We emphasize at the outset the
narrowness of our inquiry. Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, this case
does not present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id.
Weber asserted that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to -2(d) (1976) makes it unlawful to discriminate
because of race when selecting apprentices for training programs. 443 U.S. at 199-200. Subsec-
tion (a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because ofsuch individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Subsection (d) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
orjoint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or re-
training, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employ-
ment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
Id. § 2000e-3(d).
26. 443 U.S. at 204-08. See Meltzer, The Weber Case: The JudicialAbrogation oftheAnidd.r.
crimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. Cm. L. Ray. 423, 439-43 (1980).
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tion by minority employees, were [their] prime motivations. ' 27 Weber
did not assert that the extensive government contacts provided him
with a fifth amendment equal protection claim; yet these contacts were
sufficient to constitute state action and thus to entitle Weber to invoke
the rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment.28
II. PRINCIPLES OF STATE ACTION
The rights guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments
protect the individual from state aggression; "[i]ndividual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. ' 29 Courts
must therefore distinguish between individual and state action.30 State
action clearly arises from state and local legislation and from actions of
government officers that abridge individual rights. The distinction is
less clear when state activity is mixed with private activity. The
Supreme Court has found that state action can be present in three of
these mixed situations:3' private performance of a governmental func-
tion;32 judicial enforcement of a private agreement;33 and significant
government involvement with the conduct of private parties. 34 More-
over, courts are more inclined to find state action in any of these three
situations if racial discrimination has occurred.35 The Supreme Court
has not developed a uniform standard for finding state action. Gener-
ally, it sifts through the facts of a particular case to ascertain whether
the totality of government activity is sufficient to constitute state action.
27. 415 F. Supp. at 765. The district court also stated that the quota system "was prompted
not only by [Kaiser's] desire to increase the percentage of its black craftsmen,. . . but also by its
concern about compliance with rules and regulations issued by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance .... ." Id. Similarly, the court of appeals stated:
[Tihe affirmative action complained of was not imposed by the judiciary; rather, this
collective bargaining agreement was entered into to avoid future litigation and to comply
with the threats of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCC) condi-
tioning federal contracts on appropriate affirmative action.
563 F.2d at 218.
28. See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
29. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
30. See Note, State Action: Theoriesfor Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activ-
ity, 74 COLUM. L. REa. 656 (1974).
31. Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d Cir. 1975).
32. See text accompanying notes 36-42 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 43-47 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 48-69 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
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A. Private Performance of a Governmental Function.
The "white primary" cases 36 illustrate the first mixed situation:
private performance of a governmental function. The white primary
cases involved various schemes to prohibit minorities from voting in
primary elections. In Nixon v. Condon37 the Texas legislature enacted a
statute delegating to the local Democratic Party's executive committee
the power to determine voter qualifications for the Democratic primary
election. The legislature enacted this statute in response to Nixon v.
Herndon,38 in which the Supreme Court held that Texas could not for-
bid blacks to vote in primaries. The Democratic Party's executive com-
mittee continued the legislature's practice of excluding blacks from
voting in primaries. The Supreme Court held that the state's delega-
tion of authority to the Democratic Party constituted state action. The
exclusion of blacks from participating in the primaries thus violated the
fourteenth amendment:
[The members of the committee] are not acting in matters of merely
private concern like the directors or agents of business corporations.
They are acting in matters of high public interest, matters intimately
connected with the capacity of government to exercise its functions
unbrokenly and smoothly. ... The test is not whether the members
of the Executive Committee are the representatives of the State in the
strict sense in which an agent is the representative of his principal.
The test is whether they are to be classified as representatives of the
State to such an extent and in such a sense that the great restraints of
the Constitution set limits to their action.39
Private performance of governmental functions also occurs in
other contexts. In Marsh v. Alabama4° a company-owned town im-
posed criminal punishment on a person who distributed religious liter-
ature on its premises. The Court held that regardless of whether the
corporation or a municipality owned the town, it was subject to consti-
tutional limitations; the town could therefore not abridge first amend-
ment rights.4' Although the Court has classified other activities as
36. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
37. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
38. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
39. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. at 88-89. The Court may have been more willing to find state
action in the primary cases because the infringement of the right to vote directly violated the rights
guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment.
40. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
41. Id. at 507.. The Court stated:
We do not think it makes any significant constitutional difference as to the relation-
ship between the rights of the owner and those of the public that here the State, instead
of permitting the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a
town, operate a "business block" in the town and a street and sidewalk on that business
block. Cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340 [1876]. Whether a corporation or a mu-
1178 [Vol. 1980:1172
Vol. 1980:1172] STATE ACTION IN WEBER
governmental, it has been reluctant to place many activities performed
by private parties into this category.42
B. Judicial Enforcement of a Private Agreement.
In Shelley v. Kraemer43 the Supreme Court established a second
class of cases in which private'activity may constitute state action sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny. The issue in Shelley was whether "judi-
cial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race
or color" is state action.44 The Court held that a racially restrictive
covenant could not be enforced in equity against a black purchaser be-
cause such enforcement would constitute state denial of equal protec-
tion:
The judicial action in each case bears the clear and unmistakable
imprimatur of the State. We have noted that previous decisions of
this Court have established the proposition that judicial action is not
immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment simply
because it is taken pursuant to the state's common-law policy. Nor is
the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of
discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by
the terms of a private agreement. State action, as that phrase is un-
derstood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to
exertions of state power in all forms.45
nicipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in
the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication
remain free. As we have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not function
differently from any other town.
Id. at 507-08.
42. The Court has applied the governmental-function test in other private action cases. See,
e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (some shopping
centers perform public functions), questioned, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976); Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private parks render municipal services). The Supreme Court
seems, however, to be limiting the scope of the governmental-function test. In Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976), the plurality opinion of the Court would have overruled Logan Valley and
held that a shopping center does not perform a public function. Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2041-42 (1980) (holding that a state constitutional provision giving
individuals the right to solicit signatures and distribute pamphlets at a private shopping center
does not violate the owner's property rights under the fifth amendment). Similarly, in Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), the Court in effect overruled Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
In Newton an individual devised to a municipality, in trust, a tract of land that was to be used as a
park for whites only. Id. at 297. The Court held that the park services were municipal, so that the
Constitution prohibited the park's discrimination. As a result of the Newton decision, the
Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that it had become impossible to fulfill the intention of the
testator and that the trust had therefore failed. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160
(1968), aft'd, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). The Supreme Court's affirmance placed primary emphasis on
the testator's desire "that the park remain forever for the exclusive use of white people," and on
the state's nonapplication of the cypres doctrine. Id. at 447.
43. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
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Although the broad principle enunciated in Shelley could impli-
cate the state in numerous instances, the Court has not construed Shel-
ley liberally.46 Generally, more than judicial enforcement of a private
contract is required before a court will find state action. 47
C. Significant Government Involvement with the Conduct of Private
Parties.
The Supreme Court has also found state action in cases in which
the state has significant involvement with private defendants. For the
requisite involvement there must be either joint participation between
the state and the private party in the activity,48 state authorization and
encouragement of the private conduct, 49 or a "close nexus"50 between
the private conduct and the government.5 l
1. Joint Participation with the Private Party. In Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority5 2 a state agency built and owned a parking
garage. The agency leased space in the garage to a public restaurant
that refused to serve blacks. The Court determined that the state and
the private party were joint participants in the discriminatory venture.
The state had furnished gas and heat and had repaired the building's
structural flaws. Moreover, the state and the restaurant had mutually
benefited from this symbiotic relationship:
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities
of the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the
obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a
public building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that
degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory ac-
tion which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to con-
46. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), in which the Court did not
apply Shelley despite Justice Douglas's assertion in dissent that to allow an employer to dismiss an
employee for communist activity would violate the first amendment. 351 U.S. at 302 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970), the Court explicitly refused to apply
Shelley to force defendants to keep open a park that was to revert to its donor upon the park's
desegregation.
The Court has applied Shelley in other cases, however. For example, in Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953), the Court reaffirmed Shelle/s proscription ofjudicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
47. For example, in Weber, 443 U.S. at 209, the Court enforced the contract between the
United Steelworkers and Kaiser despite Weber's assertion that such enforcement would violate
the Shelley doctrine. See Brief for Respondents at 46 n.186, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979).
48. See text accompanying notes 52-58 infra.
49. See text accompanying notes 59-64 infra.
50. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
51. See text accompanying notes 65-69 inra.
52. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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demn. It is irony amounting to grave injustice that in one part of a
single building, erected and maintained with public funds by an
agency of the State to serve a public purpose, all persons have equal
rights, while in another portion, also serving the public, a Negro is a
second-class citizen . . .3
The Court noted that within the lease or contract the state could have
"affirmatively required [the private party] to discharge the responsibili-
ties under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enter-
prise as a consequence of state participation." 54 This ability, in light of
the "degree of state participation and involvement ' 55 in the discrimina-
tory action, satisfied the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court cautioned, however, that "the peculiar facts or
circumstances" of each case would determine whether government par-
ticipation subjects a venture to constitutional requirements. 56
In no case since Burton has the Supreme Court found state action
in a joint venture between private enterprise and government. Lower
courts have occasionally used the Burton analysis,57 but the restrictive
trend in state action analysis58 tempers reliance on the Burton doctrine.
53. Id. at 724.
54. Id. at 725.
55. Id. at 724.
56. Id. at 725-26.
57. See, e.g., Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1979);
Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392, 395 (8th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Botica, 537 F.2d 930, 938 (7th Cir.
1976); Ginn v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976); Sarkees v. Wright & Kremers, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 705, 706 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F. Supp. 492, 498-99 (D.R.I. 1976),
aft'dsub nom. Lamb v. Rantoul, 561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1977). See also De Malherbe v. Interna-
tional Union of Elevator Constructors, 476 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In De Malherbe the
plaintiff brought suit against a collective bargaining representative and local and international
unions, alleging that they had violated his fifth amendment rights by denying him admission to a
federally funded and monitored training program because he was not a United States citizen. The
court, finding that the defendants and the federal government were joint participants, placed par-
ticular significance on the role of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance in approving and
fostering the citizenship requirement. Id. at 652-53. The court relied on Mathis v. Opportunities
Industrialization Centers, Inc., 545 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1976), and Ginn v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 477
(9th Cir. 1976):
Ginn and Mathis together indicate that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
willing to base a finding of government action on government funding accompanied by
substantial contractual restrictions without a detailed inquiry into the degree of adminis-
trative responsibility or control vested in the entity that provided the funding. In Ginn
the court held that a Project Headstart program was a government instrumentality under
Burton, since it received substantial funding from the federal government and, "[als
might be expected, the generous purse was not made available without the ever-present
strings attached."
476 F. Supp. at 661-62.
58. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's restrictive trend in state action analysis, see
Note, State Action After Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.: AnalyticalFrameworkfor a Restric-
tive Doctrine, 81 DICK. L. REV. 315 (1977); Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L.
REV. 840 (1974).
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2. State Authorization and Encouragement of Private Conduct. In
addition to finding state action based on the joint participation of the
state and a private party in a discriminatory venture, the Supreme
Court has also found state action when the state has authorized and
encouraged private discrimination. In Reitman v. Mulkey 9 the Court
considered an amendment to the California state constitution prohibit-
ing the state from abridging "the right of any person. . . to decline to
sell, lease or rent [his] property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses." 60 Although the amendment did not os-
tensibly involve the state in private discriminatory activity, the Court
reviewed the decision of the California Supreme Court, and agreed
with that court that the intent behind the amendment was "to overturn
state laws that bore on the right of private sellers and lessors to discrim-
inate. ' 61 Because the amendment in effect had authorized the private
right to discriminate, and because the amendment's "ultimate impact"
was to encourage private racial discrimination, 62 the amendment had
involved the state "in private racial discriminations to an unconstitu-
tional degree.' ' 63 Indeed, private discrimination had become "one of
the basic policies of the state."
3. The Close-nexus Test. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.65
the Supreme Court considered a heavily regulated private utility that
had terminated a customer's service without prior notice or a hearing
before an impartial body. The customer asserted that the termination
constituted state action and, as such, denied her due process of law.
According to the customer, the state, in creating and regulating a public
utility monopoly, had either delegated a governmental function to a
private party or significantly involved itself in a private pary's activi-
ties. The Court rejected this contention,66 and held that the monopoly
59. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
60. Id. at 371-72 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964) (invalidated by Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967))).
61. 387 U.S. at 374, 376.
62. Id. at 376.
63. Id. at 376-79.
64. Id. at 381.
65. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
66. Id. at 353. The Court stated:
If we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan of some power delegated to it by the
State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our
case would be quite a different one. But while the Pennsylvania statute imposes an obli-
gation to furnish service on regulated utilities, it imposes no such obligation on the State.
The Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility serv-
ices is either a state function or a municipal duty. Girard La Insurance Co. . City of
Philadeohia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879). . . . Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and
Nebbia's upstate New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated busi-
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created by the state did not itself constitute state action.67 Instead, the
Court formulated a test that requires the party alleging state action to
show a close relationship between the state and the challenged action of
the regulated entity:
It may well be that acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least
something of a governmentally protected monopoly will more read-
ily be found to be "state" acts than will the acts of an entity lacking
these characteristics. But the inquiry must be whether there is a suffi-
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself.68
The Court failed to delineate standards that would be helpful in deter-
mining when "a sufficiently close nexus" exists between private and
public activity to trigger constitutional scrutiny. It did indicate, how-
ever, that mere government approval of or permission for a private ac-
tivity without a showing of government inducement or close
participation did not constitute state action.69
nesses, providing arguably essential goods and services, "affected with a public interest."
We do not believe that such a status converts their every action, absent more, into that of
the State.
Id. at 352-54 (footnotes omitted).
67. The Court stated:
We also reject the notion that Metropolitan's termination is state action because the State
"has specifically authorized and approved" the termination practice. In the instant case,
Metropolitan filed with the Public Utility Commission a general tariff-a provision of
which states Metropolitan's right to terminate service for nonpayment. . . . The District
Court observed that the sole connection of the Commission with this regulation was
Metropolitan's simple notice filing with the Commission and the lack of any Commis-
sion action to prohibit it.
Id. at 354-55 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the Court did not find that there had been a symbiotic
relationship or joint participation as in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
68. 419 U.S. at 350-51.
69. Lower court decisions since Metropolitan Edison have consistently distinguished between
active participation or inducement and mere approval. Thus, in cases involving state grants-in-aid
to private parties, the courts have not found state action unless the state has done more than
merely provide money and engage in general regulation. See, e.g., Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59
(7th Cir. 1978) (medicare funding of a nursing home and a hospital; funding of a private univer-
sity), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir.
1978) (government contracts); Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (funding of a private university); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of America, 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (funding of a private university); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical
Center, 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) (funding for a hospital).
The courts require that the Metropolitan Edison nexus test be satisfied even if the state has
some additional control over the parties. Thus, in Hines v. Cenla Community Action Comm., 474
F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1973), the court found no state action although the private party, a community
action agency, had received federal funding and had been required to carry out its program in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the federal grant: "Since CCAC was not a public
corporation controlled by the federal government, the plaintiff could not be a federal employee.
Therefore, CCAC as a private employer had complete freedom of action and was not bound by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 1058. The plaintiff thus failed to establish
the nexus between state involvement and the alleged unconstitutional activity. The court indi-
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D. State Action in Cases Alleging Racial Discrimination.
Besides evaluating the extent of government contact, courts often
look to the nature of a plaintiff's claim to determine whether state ac-
tion exists in a private activity. Some lower courts have indicated that
a lesser degree of state involvement is needed to invoke constitutional
protection in cases involving racial discrimination.70 This use of a
more relaxed standard for state action in cases involving racial discrim-
ination is consistent with the standard of judicial scrutiny employed in
claims asserted under the equal protection clause. Under the equal
protection clause, classifications based upon race, alienage, or national
origin are treated as inherently suspect while classifications based on
other considerations are subject to less stringent review. 7'
III. THE APPLICATION OF STATE ACTION PRINCIPLES
TO THE FACTS OF WEBER
The federal government was extensively involved in the formation
of the collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser and the United
Steelworkers of America that resulted in the Weber affirmative action
cated, however, that state action would have existed if the state had been involved in the daily
supervision of the plan. Id.
Other cases also emphasize that whether state action exists depends upon the amount of gov-
ernment supervision over the private party. Several courts have held that a state's appointment of
a majority of an institution's board of directors is either determinative of state action or an impor-
tant factor in establishing state action. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1979); O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th
Cir. 1973); Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971); Meredith v. Allen
County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Aasum v. Good Samaritan
Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Or. 1975), a'd, 542 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1976). Some courts have
indicated that the presence of even a minority of state appointees on a board of directors will be
an important factor in determining state action. See Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392 F.
Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees, 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
70. See, e.g., Granfield v. Catholic Univ. of America, 530 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir), cer. denied,
429 U.S. 821 (1976); Girard v. 94th St. and Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1975), cert,
denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc.
v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (D.R.I. 1978).
The court in Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974), commented
on the tendency of some courts to regard state action claims in discrimination cases differently:
Prior case law while not directly controlling is not, of course, unenlightening. It is note-
worthy that several courts have considered claims that the activities of tax exempt orga-
nizations constitute "state action." Significantly, these cases divide into two groups:
Where racial discrimination is involved, the courts have found "state action" to exist;
where other constitutional claims are at issue (due process, freedom of speech), the courts
have generally concluded that no "state action" has occurred .... This dichotomy is
explained in part by the double "state action" standard which has been recognized-one,
a less onerous test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more rigorous stan-
dard for other claims.... However, these results may also be explainable in terms of
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
71. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I
(1967).
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plan. Three fundamental connections between the government and the
private parties provided sufficient government contacts to invoke the
due process protections of the fifth amendment. First, the National La-
bor Relations Board certified the United Steelworkers of America as
the bargaining representative for the agreement.72 Second, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission exerted pressure upon private
industry to implement affirmative action plans.73 And third, the Office
of Federal Contractors Compliance Programs threatened to withhold
federal contracts from Kaiser if it did not develop suitable affirmative
action plans.7 4
A. Involvement of the National Labor Relations Board
The agreement between Kaiser and the Steelworkers containing
the affirmative action plan was entered into pursuant to a master collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 75 As a result, there were three possible in-
stances of state action. First, as a private bargaining representative, the
United Steelworkers implemented national labor policy, thus arguably
performing a governmental function.76 Second, the government argua-
bly enforced a racially discriminatory contract.77 And finally, the gov-
ernment significantly involved itself with the conduct of the United
Steelworkers of America. 78
1. Implementing National Labor Policy: Private Performance of a
Governmental Function. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act79 guarantees employees the basic rights of industrial self-determi-
nation: "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ' 80 These rights
effectuate the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.8'
72. See text accompanying notes 75-134 infra.
73. See text accompanying notes 135-58 infra.
74. See text accompanying notes 159-75 infra.
75. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98. The collective bargaining process is
authorized by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
76. See text accompanying notes 79-97 infra.
77. See text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
78. See text accompanying notes 104-18 infra.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
80. Id.
81. See id. § 151.
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In order to implement effectively the national labor policy embod-
ied in section 7, the Act grants the employees' bargaining representative
the exclusive right to represent the employees, once it has obtained ma-
jority support. 82 To protect minority interests within the union, Con-
gress has imposed a duty of fair representation on this bargaining
representative:
"Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents .
Steele v. Louisville & NA Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 [1944]....
It was because the national labor policy vested unions with
power to order the relations of employees with their employer that
this Court found it necessary to fashion the duty of fair representa-
tion. That duty "has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress
by the provisions of federal labor law." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
182 [19671.83
The National Labor Relations Act also binds the bargaining represen-
tative to a policy of nondiscrimination in employment.84 The duty of
fair representation thus requires the statutory representative to bargain
in good faith for the interest of all the members of the unit.85
82. Id. § 159(a). The principle of majority rule is central to the policy of fostering collective
bargaining. See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in
a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
83. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1967). The Supreme Court first
recognized the statutory duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192 (1944). In Steele the agreement between the union and the employer provided that no more
than 50% of the firemen in each class of service within each seniority district would be black and
that until that percentage was reached all vacancies would be filled by whites. The Court invali-
dated this plan, which effectively limited the opportunity for black employees, because the union
had failed to represent them fairly. The Court stated that although a statutory representative may
enter into a contract that unfavorably affects some of its members, such unfavorable treatment
must be based upon "relevant differences." Id. at 203. "mhe discriminations based on race
alone," the Court concluded, were "obviously irrelevant and invidious." ld.
Although Steele interpreted actions imposed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188 (1976), the doctrine of fair representation has been extended to actions under the National
Labor Relations Act. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944). See generally M.
SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 158-59 (1966); H.
WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 129-84 (1968).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976); see Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm.
Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 66 (1975). See also United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
85. See American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), in which the
Supreme Court explained that "when authority derives in part from the Government's thumb on
the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to
its exercise by the Government itself." As a result, "the public interest in the good faith exercise of
that power is very great." Id. at 401-02.
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A bargaining representative enjoys other benefits besides the ex-
clusive right to represent the union. One of these is the rule that ties
employees to the union they elect for one year after the election, during
which no rival union may file for an election to represent the workers. 86
This contract-bar rule extends the protection against rival union chal-
lenges to the life of a collective bargaining agreement, up to a maxi-
mum of three years.87
The National Labor Relations Board is vested with primary au-
thority to ensure that the bargaining representative does in fact effectu-
ate national labor policy.8 8 The Board has authority to conduct
elections of representatives, 89 to prevent unfair labor practices, 90 and to
enforce the duty of fair representation.9' The Board can, for example,
decertify a bargaining representative and strip it of its exclusive right to
represent the workers on finding that it has failed to represent minority
employees fairly.92 The Board has also indicated that it will deny the
benefits of the contract-bar rule to a bargaining representative that has
practiced racial discrimination or allowed racial discrimination to ap-
pear on the face of the contract. 93 Consequently, the Board has signifi-
cant powers and duties to ensure that a bargaining representative such
as the United Steelworkers of America acts in accordance with the
mandates of the National Labor Relations Act.
A bargaining representative, as supervised by the National Labor
Relations Board, thus has considerable responsibility for implementing
national labor policy. Under Nixon v. Condon94 such private perform-
ance of a governmental function would appear to constitute state ac-
tion, requiring constitutional review of a bargaining representative's
actions. The Supreme Court has been reluctant, however, to find that
private actions constitute performance of a governmental function. 95
86. "No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in any bargaining unit or any
subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been
held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (1976).
87. See General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962); Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 995, 998-1004 (1958).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
89. Id. § 159(c)(1).
90. Id. § 160(a).
91. See Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). The Supreme Court neither
recognized nor rejected the doctrine.
92. Independent Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Pioneer Bus Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1962); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 321-24 (1953).
93. See Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1962). See also St. Louis Cordage Mills, 168
N.L.R.B. 981 (1967).
94. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
95. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
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Generally, such findings have been made only when private parties
performed municipal activities, as in Marsh v. Alabama,96 or became
involved with voting qualifications, as in Nixon v. Condon.97 Thus a
bargaining representative's role in effectuating national labor policy
probably does not in itself constitute state action. Nonetheless, the col-
lective bargaining agreement in Weber, when considered together with
other government contacts, does indicate state action.
2. Judicial Enforcement of a Racially Discriminatory Contract.
The Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer98 held that judicial enforce-
ment of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action denying
equal protection of the laws.99 In Weber the collective bargaining
agreement between Kaiser and the United Steelworkers of America
contained a provision that restricted the opportunities of nonminority
workers in favor of minority workers. Under the rationale of Shelley,
judicial enforcement of the racially restrictive contract in Weber should
constitute state action. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Local 2548, United Tex-
tile Workers,1°° a federal district court did apply Shelley in the context
of enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. In that case, the
employer and the bargaining representative entered into a collective
bargaining agreement that contained a provision allowing the employer
to schedule Sunday work for its employees. The petitioning employee
claimed that such an agreement violated rights guaranteed by the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment; the employer responded
that no state action was involved. The court rejected the employer's
response, stating that Shelley applied:
I find the requisite government action furnished by this Court's
action, under the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer .... In Shelley,
the Supreme Court held that a private agreement which would be
unconstitutional if entered into by the state was valid, so long as its
terms were voluntarily adhered to by private parties. The Court con-
cluded, however, that any attempt to seek judicial enforcement of the
agreement would sufficiently involve the state in an unconstitutional
.activity so as to preclude enforcement. Both the Supreme Court and
the First Circuit have acknowledged the applicability of Shelley to
the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. Railway Em-
ployers' Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 n. 4... (1956);
Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
96. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
97. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
98. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
99. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
100. 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975).
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404 U.S. 872 [1971] .... 101
The Ciba-Geigy decision is persuasive because enforcement of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement involves not only the court's action but also
the supervision of the National Labor Relations Board.1 02 Thus, even
greater government contact with the private activity exists in collective
bargaining agreements than in Shelley, in which only judicial enforce-
ment was involved. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's reluctance to
extend the Shelley doctrine 03 indicates that it would probably not app-
ly Shelley in the Weber context.
3. Government Contact with the Bargaining Representative. A
third factor a court might consider in determining whether state action
exists in a Weber situation is simply the extent of the government's
involvement with the activity of the bargaining representative. A court
could find state action, for example, based on the joint participation
between the National Labor Relations Board and the bargaining repre-
sentative. °4 Alternatively, a court might rule that the monopoly
granted the bargaining representative results in a close nexus between
state and private activity, and thus constitutes state action. 05
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority0 6 the Court concluded
that there can be state action based on joint participation when the
state and a private party have substantial contacts and they benefit mu-
tually from a joint activity. 10 7 Arguably, the National Labor Relations
Board is a joint participant with the bargaining representative: the rep-
resentative plays an essential role in effectuating the national policy'0 8
and furthers the policy of minimizing industrial strife by encouraging
organized negotiations. 0 9 Indeed, Congress intended to rely upon the
independently organized unions, which in turn must rely on the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board,"10 to implement the national labor pol-
icy. Consequently, the relationship between the government and the
representative is symbiotic, and thus similar to the relationship between
the state and the restaurant in Burton.
101. Id. at 298 (citations omitted).
102. See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
103. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
104. See text accompanying notes 106-10 infra.
105. See text accompanying notes 111-18 infra.
106. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
107. Id. at 721-26. See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
108. See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
1189Vol. 1980:1172]
DUKE LAW JOUPVAL
Even if the courts do not consider the bargaining representative
and the government joint participants under Burton, they may still find
state action under the nexus test enunciated in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.It' Under the nexus test a party seeking constitutional pro-
tection must show a close relationship between the state involvement
and the challenged activity of the private entity, so that the private ac-
tion may be treated as that of the state.' 2 Mere governmental knowl-
edge or approval of the private activity will not constitute state
action."13 Under Metropolitan Edison the state-granted monopoly in
Weber would not itself satisfy the nexus test." 4 There are, however,
two significant distinctions between Metropolitan Edison and Weber,
making a finding of state action in the Weber context more likely.
First, a Weber situation involves an alleged denial of equal protection
instead of a violation of procedural due process as claimed in Metropol-
itan Edison. Courts are more willing to find state action when a plain-
tiff alleges racial discrimination." 5 The second distinction involves the
.nature of the monopoly in Weber. In Metropolitan Edison the state
agency was regulating a natural monopoly that would exist regardless
of state protection." 6 The state regulation was intended "not to aid the
company but to prevent its charging monopoly prices .... ,,17 The
Court found that this limited government involvement with the utility's
termination procedures did not constitute state action. The monopoly
position of the statutory representative in Weber, however, was not the
result of a natural monopoly, but was created solely by Congress's en-
actment of the National Labor Relations Act." 8 This fact, together
with the bargaining representative's role in effectuating national labor
policy and the Board's close supervision of the representative, indicates
a much closer nexus between the government and the private party
than there was in Metropolitan Edison. Moreover, if either the Federal
Office of Contract Compliance Programs or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission requires that a racially discriminatory plan
be inserted into the collective bargaining agreement, there is clearly a
tight nexus and a need for constitutional scrutiny of the agreement.
111. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
112. Seeid. at 351.
113. See note 69 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
116. For discussion of natural monopolies, see T. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ECO-
NOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 5-23 (1976).
117. 419 U.S. at 367 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
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4. State Action in Collective Bargaining Agreements. Several
lower court decisions have found state action based on collective bar-
gaining agreements when the government has authorized or en-
couraged potentially unconstitutional activity. In Linscott v. Millers
Falls Co.119 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered a
collective bargaining agreement that provided for the creation and
maintenance of a union shop, and that required all employees to pay
dues or be discharged by the employer. One employee, a Seventh-Day
Adventist, refused to pay dues because her religion forbade contribut-
ing money to a union. She was subsequently discharged by her em-
ployer. In a suit for injunctive relief and damages, the employee
claimed that the dues requirement deprived her of the right to free ex-
ercise of religion under the first amendment. The employer argued that
the employee had been discharged pursuant to a private agreement,
and that therefore no state action was present.'20
The court rejected the employer's argument. Concluding that sec-
tion 14(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act 121 constituted "fed-
eral approval" of a union shop, 122 the court stated that the federal
statute was "the source of the power and authority by which private
rights [were] lost or sacrificed."123 As a result, the employer's discharge
sufficiently involved the government for the discharge to be subject to
first amendment reyiew.' 24 The Linscott court's analysis thus resem-
bled that of the Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 125 in which the
Court concluded that a court should assess the potential impact of offi-
cial action to determine if the state has significantly involved itself with
invidious discrimination. 26
In Cubas v. RapidAmerican Corp. 2 7 a federal district court indi-
cated that although congressional authorization of a bargaining repre-
sentative alone would not constitute state action, congressional
authorization of specific discriminatory action by the representative
would implicate the government in that activity. In declining to find
119. 440 F.2d 14 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
120. 440 F.2d at 16-17.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976). Section 14(b) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment in any state or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
122. 440 F.2d at 17.
123. Id. at 16 (quoting Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956)).
124. 440 F.2d at 17.
125. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
126. 387 U.S. at 380.
127. 420 F. Supp. 663, 669 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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state action in the mere certification of a union as a bargaining repre-
sentative, the court stated:
Plaintiff relies primarily on Linscot v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14
(1st Cir. 1971) a case in which the relevant actions by the union con-
sisted of carrying out a procedure that Congress had specifically en-
dorsed[.] 440 F.2d at 16 n. 2. The holding does not stand for the
proposition that all actions taken by unions which are under the ju-
risdiction of the National Labor Relations Act are governmental ac-
tions. In the instant case, the Local's allegedly unlawful behavior
was not taken in connection with efforts to comply with a federally
favored procedure. Consequently, plaintiffs First and Fifth Amend-
ment claims. . . must be dismissed .... 128
Finally, in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.129
the court held that state action would exist if the National Labor Rela-
tions Board required an employer to negotiate with a bargaining repre-
sentative that discriminated on the basis of race:
When a governmental agency recognizes such a union to be the bar-
gaining representative it significantly. becomes a willing participant
in the union's discriminatory practices. Although the union itself is
not a governmental instrumentality the National Labor Relations
Board is. N.L.R.B. v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 . . . (1971).
Moreover, here the Board seeks judicial enforcement of its order re-
quiring collective bargaining in a federal court. Obviously, judicial
enforcement of private discrimination cannot be sanctioned. 130
Under Linscott, Cubas, and Mansion House, state action thus ex-
ists when the National Labor Relations Act or the National Labor Re-
lations Board coerces, directly encourages, or actively approves of a
specific activity of the bargaining representative. 13' Though it is un-
clear whether the Supreme Court would follow the rationale of these
128. Id.
129. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
130. Id. at 473 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the relationship of the National Labor
Relations Board and racial discrimination by the statutory representative, see Axelrod & Kauf-
man, Mansion House-Bekins-Handy Andy: The National Labor Relations Board's Role in Ra-
cial Discrimination Cases, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 675, 682-88 (1977) (discussing legislative
history); Leslie, GovernmentalAction and Standing: NLRB Certifcation of Discriminatory Unions,
1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35; Meltzer, he National Labor Relations Act andfRacial Discrimination- The
More Remedies the Better?, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1974); Note, Union Racial Discrimination: A
Liberalized Standard of Proof, 58 MINN. L. REv. 335 (1973); Note, The Impact of De Facto Dis.
crimination by Unions on the Availability of NLRB Bargaining Orders, 47 S. CAL. L. RE v. 1353
(1974); 7 GA. L. Rav. 770 (1973).
131. In Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 148-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 942 (1979), the petitioner argued that the NLRB had violated the fifth amendment by grant-
ing exclusive bargaining representative status to a union that had previously discriminated against
women. The court rejected this argument and held that the Board's certification of a union did
not violate the fifth amendment because the certification had not authorized or encouraged dis-
crimination. 598 F.2d at 149. Board certification imposed on the union an affirmative duty not to
discriminate, however, and subjected the union to sanctions for future discrimination. Id. Dis-
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cases, they nonetheless provide persuasive authority that state action is
present in the Weber context. In Weber the National Labor Relations
Board, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Of-
fice of Federal Contract Compliance Programs approved 132 or en-
couraged 133 the racially restrictive contract. Thus, there was greater
government involvement in Weber than in Cubas, in which the only
government contact alleged was the general grant of the bargaining
representative's powers. Even the Cubas court, though refusing to find
state action, implied that specific government authorization of the pri-
vate activity would constitute state action. 134
B. Involvement of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The extensive pressure the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission exerted in Weber constitutes a second fundamental connection
between the government and the private parties who entered into the
collective bargaining agreement. The Commission's primary function
is to eliminate unlawful employment practices.135 In creating the Com-
mission, Congress established a procedure whereby state and local
agencies, as well as the national commission, would have an opportu-
nity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion
before the aggrieved party is permitted to file a lawsuit. 136 In the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,137 Congress amended Title VII
to give the Commission authority to investigate charges of discrimina-
tion, to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title
VII, and to institute civil actions against the employer or union named
crimination by a certified union and tacit acceptance by the Board, the court indicated, would
constitute state action:
Once certified, a union is invested with significant governmental powers, and passive
acquiescence by the Board in union discrimination might well pose serious constitutional
questions. Both the Court and the Board have avoided these difficulties by interpreting
the Act to prohibit such discrimination, and by providing a wide variety of sanctions to
enforce the prohibition.
Id. at 149-50.
132. The National Labor Relations Board knew of the racially restrictive contract in Weber
and in effect approved that contract by not invoking its sanctioning powers. See text accompany-
ing notes 88-93 supra.
133. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission encouraged affirmative action by
threatening to bring suit against industries without satisfactory affirmative action plans. See text
accompanying notes 135-5 8 infra. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs also pro-
moted affirmative action by awarding lucrative government contracts to industries that imple-
mented satisfactory plans. See text accompanying notes 159-75 infra.
134. 420 F. Supp. at 669.
135. Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 1970).
136. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
137. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976)).
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in a discrimination charge. 138 The Act uses the term "voluntary com-
pliance" merely as a term of art; the term does not imply that there is
private compliance without any government coercion. Rather, it means
compliance in the absence of judicial intervention. 139 The Commis-
sion's role is to encourage and, if necessary, to pressure private parties
to make amends for past discrimination. 40
Before Weber, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
had exerted significant pressure on Kaiser. Kaiser officials denied at
trial that Kaiser had discriminated in hiring or promotion; they stated,
however, that the company was aware of its vulnerability to private or
government lawsuits under Title VII. t41 The officials explained that
they had been defendants in Title VII litigation involving other plants
similar to the one at Gramercy.1 42 Furthermore, the Kaiser officials
intimated that the government's industry-wide lawsuit against the steel
industry in United States v. Allegheny-Ludium Industries, Inc.'43 influ-
enced the Kaiser collective bargaining agreement. 144 Recognizing their
potential vulnerability to such suits, the bargaining representative and
Kaiser entered into the collective bargaining agreement that included
the affirmative action plan. 45
138. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.s. at 44.
139. Id. at 44-47.
140. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 843, 847, 868-69 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See generally Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424
F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969);
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 n.8 (5th Cir. 1968).
Section 706a of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976), provides:
[The Commission ... shall make an investigation .... If the Commission determines
after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,
the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.
Furthermore, section 706(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976), pro-
vides:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days
after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) ... the Commis-
sion has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable
to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not
a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a governmental agency, thus is involved in
bringing about a voluntary settlement.
141. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6-7, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979).
142. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 141, at 6.
143. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See text accompanying
notes 146-54 infra.
144. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 141, at 6-7. Doubtless, the United Steelwork-
ers officials were also familiar with Allegheny-Ludlum, for the United Steelworkers had been
named a defendant in that case.
145. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 141, at 6-7.
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The specific pressures exerted by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission were not indicated in the Weber record. The facts in
Allegheny-Ludlum, however, illustrate the pressures that the Commis-
sion typically exerts upon private parties to encourage their implemen-
tation of effective affirmative action plans. In Allegheny-Ludlum the
Secretary of Labor and the Commission sued nine major steel compa-
nies and the United Steelworkers of America alleging widespread hir-
ing discrimination and job-assignment discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, and national origin. The complaint alleged that the compa-
nies had violated Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246146 by hiring
and assigning employees on impermissible grounds and by restricting
ethnic minorities and females to low-paying and undesirable jobs. The
complaint also charged the companies and the union with formulating,
in the collective bargaining contracts, systems for promotion, layoff, re-
call, and transfer that deprived minority and female employees of op-
portunities for advancement comparable to those opportunities enjoyed
by white males. 147 The Commission fied the complaint after six
months of negotiations with the collective bargaining representative,
during which time the parties had attempted to establish voluntary
compliance with Title VII. The Commission and the private parties
settled after the defendants agreed to comply with Title VII.148
An examination of the provisions of the Allegheny-Ludlum consent
decree illustrates the coercive and supervisory powers the Commission
exercises when effectuating "voluntary compliance." For example, in
order to avoid possible interpretative problems with the decree, the
parties provided for enforcement procedures through a nationwide sys-
tem of implementation committees located within the local plants.
Each committee included at least two union representatives and two
company representatives; in addition, the government was entitled to
designate a representative to meet with any implementation committee.
146. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232
(1976). See text accompanying notes 159-68 infra.
147. 517 F.2d at 834.
148. 517 F.2d at 834-35. Consent Decree I provided:
The substantive relief falls into three basic categories: (1) immediate implementation of
broad plantwide seniority, along with transfer and testing reforms, and adoption of on-
going mechanisms for further reforms of seniority, departmental and line of progression
(LOP) structures, all of which are designed to correct the continuing effects of past dis-
criminatory assignments; (2) establishment of goals and timetables for fuller utilization
of females and minorities in occupations and job categories from which they were dis-
criminatorily excluded in the past; and (3) a back pay fund of $30,940,000, to be paid to
minority and female employees injured by the unlawful practices alleged in the com-
plaint.
Id. at 835. Also, Consent Decree II required the companies "to initiate affirmative action pro-
grams in hiring, initial assignments, promotions, management training, and recruitment of minor-
ities and females." Id.
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The implementation committees were -responsible for ensuring compli-
ance with the consent decrees at the local plants and for establishing
goals and timetables for affirmative action.' 49
A second committee, the audit and review committee, also ensured
compliance with the consent decree. This committee, composed of five
management members, five union members, and one Commission
member, was created to enforce consent decrees that were not being
implemented properly. 150 The committee met regularly to oversee
compliance and to resolve disputes, including those unresolved by the
local implementation committees. One of the most significant clauses
of the Allegheny-Ludlum consent decree provided that any issue not
unanimously resolved by the audit and review committee could be
brought by the dissenting member before a federal district court.' 5 '
Thus, if the government member of the committee did not approve of
the execution of the consent decree, he could force litigation over the
particular issue, in effect exercising a veto power. This is a powerful
weapon to force the company and the bargaining representative to ac-
cept the Commission's interpretation of the consent decree. The audit
and review committee was also responsible for modifying the consent
decree if it appeared that the company was not properly remedying the
past discrimination.' 52 If the Commission representative was at this
point dissatisfied with the consent decree he could file suit in federal
district court. '5 3 Moreover, if he determined that the company was not
eliminating past discrimination or that the parties were not complying
with the consent decree, he could treat the alleged violations as new
violations of Title VII (or of Executive" Order No. 11,246).154 Thus, the
government had significant coercive powers to ensure that the company
executed an effective affirmative action plan.
The intensive network of control the Commission exercises in or-
ganizing and implementing affirmative action plans could prompt a
court, in a Weber context, to conclude that the activity of the bargain-
ing representative constitutes state action. A court might, for example,
find elements of coercion in the Commission's activities, having an ef-
fect similar to the apparent government encouragement of discrimina-
tion in Reitman v. Mulkey.'55 Or the Commission's involvement with
affirmative action plans might lead to a finding of state action under the
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id at 835-36.
152. Id. at 836.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 838.
155. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
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nexus test of Metropolitan Edison.156 The Commission's use of coer-
cion to induce private parties to establish affirmative action plans cer-
tainly indicates a "close nexus between the State and the challenged
action."157 Indeed, the Commission's use of a veto power, illustrated in
Allegheny-Ludlum,158 reinforces the nexus between the government's
actions and the challenged activity. By use of such a veto, the Commis-
sion can force the statutory representative and the company to accede
to its demands. The nexus between the state and the challenged activ-
ity is certainly close.
C. Involvement of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs.
The pressure the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP) exerts on employers and unions constitutes a third connec-
tion between the government and private parties in the Weber context.
The primary responsibility of the OFCCP 59 is to effectuate the direc-
tives of Executive Order No. 11,246,160 issued by President Johnson,
which requires federally assisted construction contractors and their
subcontractors to accord equal employment opportunity in order to do
business with the federal government.' 6' Executive Order No.
12,086162 and Executive Order No. 11,246163 authorize the Secretary of
Labor to adopt rules, regulations, and orders to implement Executive
156. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
157. Id. at 351. See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 150-54 supra.
159. The OFCCP "is responsible for establishing policies and goals and providing leadership
and coordination of the Government's program to achieve nondiscrimination in employment by
Government contractors and subcontractors .... " OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NA-
TIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 1980/81, at 416 (1980). In June of 1975 the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance was merged with two other Department of Labor equal employment programs to
form the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. [1978] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) § 421,
at 201.
160. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232
(1976).
161. Exec. Order No. 11,246 requires affirmative action by government contractors and sub-
contractors with regard to various aspects of employment, including "employment, upgrading,
demotion or transfer, recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or
other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship." 3 C.F.R. at
340, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1233. The Secretary of Labor requires contractors and
subcontractors meeting certain minimum standards to file annual employment reports, 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-1.7 (1979), and to develop and implement written affirmative action programs that establish
procedures, goals, and timetables for increased hiring and promotion of minorities and women, id.
§ 60-1.40.
162. 3 C.F.R. 230 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 1453 (Supp. 11 1978).
163. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232
(1976).
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Order No. 11,246 and its provisions. The OFCCP regulations require
that government contracts of over $10,000,164 if not exempt, 165 include
equal employment opportunity provisions. 66 Contractors are, for ex-
ample, prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination and
are required to fulfill certain affirmative obligations. 167 Moreover, Ex-
ecutive Order No. 11,246 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to require
periodic compliance reports from the contractor and to investigate the
contractor to ensure compliance with those duties.' 68 To help imple-
ment the program, the OFCCP has established a system of area coor-
dinators to develop government-wide compliance programs for labor
market areas.
In Weber the OFCCP exerted pressure on Kaiser to institute the
affirmative action plan. As the court of appeals noted,
the case ... is unique in that the affirmative action complained of
was not imposed by the judiciary; rather, this collective bargaining
agreement was entered into to avoid future litigation and to comply
with the threats of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams conditioning federal contracts on appropriate affirmative ac-
tion. 16 9
In fact, the involvement of the OFCCP was very similar to that of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Allegheny-Ludlum.
Both agencies were moving forces behind their respective affirmative
action plans, for both could ensure compliance with affirmative action
objectives through coercive tactics. The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission could, for example, threaten the company with Title
VII litigation; the OFCCP could threaten to withhold government con-
tracts or to invalidate present contracts. 170
Because they are determinative forces in private decision-making,
these threats to withhold future contracts or to invalidate present ones
164. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(1) (1979). Also included in the OFCCP regulations are contracts or
subcontracts that are bills of lading, that involve depositories of federal funds, or that involve
financial institutions paying or issuing United States savings bonds. Id.
165. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 (1979). Most contracts under $10,000, contracts and subcontracts for
indefinite quantities, contracts for work performed outside the United States, contracts with state
or local governments, contracts with certain educational institutions, contracts to be performed
near Indian Reservations, and contracts explicitly exempted by the Director of OFCCP are ex-
empt. Id. § 60-1.5(a) to -1.5(b). However, the Director of OFCCP may withdraw any exemption
to further the goals of Executive Order No. 11,246. Id. § 60-1.5(d).
166. Id. § 60-1.4.
167. Id.
168. 3 C.F.R. 339, § 203(c) (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at
1232 (1976).
169. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub
nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
170. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209(a)(5), 3 C.F.R. 339, 344 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232 (1976); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a) (1979).
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appear to constitute state action under Reitman v. Mulkey.'71 Such
threats necessarily would have a coercive effect upon private parties
and encourage them to implement affirmative action plans. Adoption
of the affirmative action plans could also constitute state action either
under the Metropolitan Edison nexus test'72 or under the theory that the
OFCCP and the private parties are joint venturers as in Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority.173 An employer's implementation of an af-
firmative action plan in response to an OFCCP threat to invalidate or
withhold federal contracts indicates, at the very least, a close nexus be-
tween the OFCCP and the plan. Similarly, a finding of joint participa-
tion under Burton may be based on the relationship between the
government and private contractors created by Executive Order No.
11,246 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.' 74 To execute the
objectives of this executive order, the government must rely upon ac-
ceptance of the government contract by private individuals. At the
same time, private contractors must depend upon federal contracts for
their work. The result is a symbiotic relationship between the govern-
ment and private contractors, much like the relationship between the
parking authority and the restaurant in Burton. 75 The similarity of
these two relationships is enhanced by the OFCCP's power to insert
into government contracts whatever clause it desires concerning racial
discrimination. Reitman v. Mulkey, the nexus test of Metropolitan
Edison, and the joint participants test of Burton thus all indicate that
the activities of the OFCCP are, in the Weber context, sufficiently inte-
grated with private decision-making to cause the private adoption of an
affirmative action plan to be state action, subject to scrutiny under the
fifth amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
In United Steelworkers v. Weber the Supreme Court held that an
affirmative action plan that gave preference to black workers over
white workers did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Although the plaintiff in Weber did not seriously challenge the consti-
tutionality of his employer's affirmative action plan, the government's
involvement with the plan indicates that sufficient state action existed
to trigger constitutional review. Rather than applying a rigid formula
171. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
172. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
173. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 159-68 supra and accompanying text.
175. See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
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to determine when state action exists, courts generally examine the par-
ticular facts or circumstances of a given case.
In Weber the government had three significant contacts with the
affirmative action plan. First, the National Labor Relations Board's
certification of the United Steelworkers of America as the exclusive
bargaining agent for Kaiser workers, under several of the Supreme
Court's state action tests, is sufficient to implicate the government in
that representative's activities. Second, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's pressure to implement particular affirmative ac-
tion plans also supports a finding that the Weber plan resulted from
state action. Finally, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams' threat to withhold or invalidate government contracts in the ab-
sence of affirmative action plans clearly constitutes the type of
involvement that has led some courts to treat ostensibly private activity
as that of the state.
Courts in the future are likely to address affirmative action plans
in the Weber factual setting. These courts should subject such affirma-
tive action plans to constitutional scrutiny.
Randolph K Herndon
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